错误信念理解能力的获得与早期发展——基于共享意图性理论

doi:10.19988/j.cnki.issn.2095-1159.2026.05.004

心理研究

2026, Vol. 19

Issue (5): 410-418 DOI: 10.19988/j.cnki.issn.2095-1159.2026.05.004

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错误信念理解能力的获得与早期发展——基于共享意图性理论

刘航¹, 李阳阳^1,2

1 东北师范大学教育学部,长春130024;
2 滨州实验学校,滨州 256600

The acquisition and early development of false belief understanding ability-based on shared intentionality theory

LIU Hang¹, LI Yangyang^1,2

1 Faculty of Education, Northeast Normal University, Changchun 130024;
2 Binzhou Experimental School, Binzhou 256600

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摘要基于共享意图性理论,从种系发生和个体发展两个层面对错误信念理解的心理机制进行梳理和阐释。文献总结发现,推断他人信念的能力发展模式依赖于人类特有的“合作”文化机制,通过持续与他人协调心理状态的经验个体逐步获得对他人错误信念的理解。从进化过程看,早期人类基于合作动机在视角性认知表征和递归推理基础上与他人进行社会、心理协调。从个体发生看,婴儿期个体构建了两视角概念,采用想象和追踪他人的认知活动进行视角加工;3岁时建立了第三视角,但协调多视角仍存在困难;4岁左右通过协调视角进而理解他人的错误信念。同时,在个体视角结构及视角协调发生发展的不同阶段,涉及了联合注意、视觉观点采择、言语、执行功能等认知技能参与。未来,可开展关于个体早期视角结构及加工方式变化的脑影像学研究,对“个体如何建构现实的客观性”等问题进行理论探究。

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	刘航
	李阳阳

关键词 ：错误信念理解, 共享意图性, 心理理论, 进化

基金资助:全国教育科学规划教育部青年项目（EQA240430）

通讯作者: 刘航,女,副教授,博士生导师。Email：liuh974@nenu.edu.cn

引用本文:

刘航, 李阳阳. 错误信念理解能力的获得与早期发展——基于共享意图性理论[J]. 心理研究, 2026, 19(5): 410-418.
LIU Hang, LI Yangyang. The acquisition and early development of false belief understanding ability-based on shared intentionality theory. Psychological Research, 2026, 19(5): 410-418.

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http://xlyj.magtech.com.cn/CN/10.19988/j.cnki.issn.2095-1159.2026.05.004 或 http://xlyj.magtech.com.cn/CN/Y2026/V19/I5/410

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