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| The acquisition and early development of false belief understanding ability-based on shared intentionality theory |
| LIU Hang1, LI Yangyang1,2 |
1 Faculty of Education, Northeast Normal University, Changchun 130024;
2 Binzhou Experimental School, Binzhou 256600 |
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Abstract Based on shared intentionality theory, the psychological mechanisms of false belief understanding are explained from phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives. The ability to infer others’ beliefs depends on humans’ unique cooperative cultural mechanism. Individuals gradually understand others’ false beliefs through coordinated mental state experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, early humans engaged in social and psychological coordination based on cooperative motivation, perspective-taking, and recursive reasoning. From an ontogenetic perspective, individuals construct two-perspective concepts and use imagination and tracking of others’ cognitive activities for perspective processing. Around age 3, a third perspective emerges, but coordination among multiple perspectives remains difficult. Around age 4, false beliefs are understood through perspective coordination. Joint attention, visual perspective-taking, language, and executive function support perspective structures at different developmental stages. Future research should conduct neuroimaging techniques on changes in the structure and processing modes of early-life perspectives, and pursue theoretical investigations into how individuals construct the objectivity of reality.
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