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| The reshaping of the body concept and the origin of the mind |
| LI Lili1,2, FU Yujia2 |
1 Xinjiang Key Laboratory of Mental Development and Learning Science, Urumqi 830017;
2 School of Psychology, Xinjiang Normal University, Urumqi 830017 |
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Abstract Since the 20th century, one have changed the attitude towards the body while criticizing Descartes’ dualism. On the one hand, it has changed the concept that the body is the components of the physical world, revealing phenomenality and systematicness of the body. On the other hand, it emphasizes the subjectivity and epistemological status of the body. This transformation not only fundamentally changes people’s perspectives on themselves and the world, from binary separation to systematic interaction, but also makes the problem of the origin of the mind solvable. Under the concept of phenomenal body, the body is no longer an objective object external to me, a carrier that can be separated from me and only provides nutrition and shelter for the mind, but rather an experiential starting point from which the mind develops. The mind is no longer a given thing, no longer a ghost placed in the body, no longer a homunculus in the brain that command and control the body machine, but the internal construction of body perception and movement. Therefore, the bodily experience is an important source of mental occurrence and development.
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